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Introduction
Judicial independence (JI) is an important precondition for implementing the rule of law. Its effective implementation is supposed to guarantee that all subjects are treated equally under the law, independent of their political influence or status.
There is also mounting evidence that having such an independent judiciary is conducive to economic growth (see, e.g., Feld and Voigt 2003; Gutmann and Voigt 2017; Voigt et al. 2015) . It is, thus, not surprising that international organizations, such as the World Bank, have been trying for years and with substantial amounts of resources to promote JI. If the functioning of the judicial sector is important for a country's development, then taking measures to improve its quality seems like a straightforward plan (Helmke and McLean 2014) . Whether these endeavors are promising is, however, a different question. The scant literature on the determinants of judicial independence seems to suggest that judicial independence is largely determined by factors that are beyond the control of politicians (see Hayo and Voigt 2007; Melton and Ginsburg 2014) .
The Council of Europe has adopted an indirect approach towards improving judicial quality in Europe. Its "European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice" (CEPEJ) compares hundreds of characteristics of the judicial systems of member states. By making these comparisons publicly available, CEPEJ not only provides guidance on how the judiciary can be managed, but it also exerts gentle pressure on countries that perform below expectations to reform their judiciary. Similar benchmarking programs have been set up by the OECD (see Palumbo et al. 2013 ) and the European Commission (2016, the "EU Justice Scoreboard").
An assumption shared by representatives of all these organizations appears to be that good formal institutions are an important and effective tool in enhancing the quality of the judicial system. More precisely, by passing legislation one could make a country's judiciary more independent. Based on data published as part of the EU Justice Scoreboard, we show that the de jure independence of the judiciary and its actual independence (as perceived by members of society) are significantly negatively correlated. This is a puzzling observation that could demoralize policymakers who hope to improve the quality of the judiciary.
After presenting this puzzle in more detail in the next section, we test some potential explanations in Section 3. Since none of them allow us to piece together the puzzle, we resort to a more fundamental explanation in Section 4. We ask whether cultural aspects -such as the levels of individualism and generalized trust in a country -are better suited to solve our puzzle. We find that both individualism and trust are highly correlated with JI. Hence, we argue that culture is an important factor determining JI. At the same time, countries with high levels of individualism and trust are less likely to introduce regulation that could preserve the independence of the judiciary. The combination of these two effects can explain why judicial reforms that should be conducive to an independent judiciary may seem on the surface to have adverse consequences. Section 5 concludes.
The Puzzle
We construct a de jure JI-indicator drawing on data contained in EU Justice Scoreboard (2016) . It is based on three components, namely: (i) how difficult it is to transfer judges against their will, (ii) how difficult it is to dismiss judges, and (iii) how difficult it is to manipulate the allocation of incoming cases to individual judges. Furthermore, our de facto measure of JI is composed of the stated perceptions of both the general public and business people. These and all other indicators used in this study are explained in more detail in Appendix A.
Appendix B provides descriptive statistics for all indicators.
<<< Figure 1 about here >>> Surprisingly, in our sample of 28 EU member states, the bivariate correlation between our two indicators for the independence of judges is negative and statistically significant (r = -0.39). Figure 1 depicts this negative association graphically. To rule out that our observation is due to the specific construction of our indicators, we compare the results to those we obtain when drawing on two established indicators of de jure and de facto judicial independence, which were introduced by Feld and Voigt (2003) and recently updated by Voigt et al. (2015) .
Based on the 25 EU member states covered by these two indicators (data is missing for Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta), we get a correlation coefficient that is only slightly smaller than before (r = -0.33). This is remarkable, given that the indicators by Voigt et al. (2015) measure JI based on the highest court of a country and their de facto indicator is built from objective information. In contrast, the de jure indicator we have constructed here from the EU Justice Scoreboard focuses on first and second instance courts; and our de facto indicator is perception-based.
<<< Table 1 about here >>> Table 1 shows that the negative association between de jure and de facto JI in the EU is driven by the de jure subcomponent for constraints on the transfer of judges against their will.
Putting Together the Puzzle
In a next step, we hope to resolve the puzzle by testing two potential explanations for why countries with better legal institutions for the protection of JI appear to end up with lower levels of de facto JI. The EU's Justice Scoreboard is limited to EU member states, which constrains our analysis to a cross-sectional comparison of 28 cases. The scoreboard is not suited to comparison over time.
The first potential explanation is based on the enlargement process of the EU.
New member states need to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, which require stable democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law. The accession process entails a detailed screening of a candidate country's laws regarding differences to EU law. At the end of this process, the candidate country is supposed to have implemented the Acquis Communautaire, the full set of European directives and regulations. The Eastern enlargements of the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 incorporated countries into the EU that had experienced only a brief record of democracy and rule of law after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In many respects, their democratic systems were not as stable and established as those of the old EU-15. Being eager to enter the EU, these countries were forced to pass legal reforms over short periods of time to convince the EU that their laws and administrative capacity were sufficient to execute EU law. In this process, member states with relatively bad de facto institutions might have tried to compensate their deficits by passing exemplary legal acts. 1 If this is the reason for the observed negative association between de jure and de facto JI in the European Union, we would expect this result to be driven by the new member states, which introduced black letter laws that they were either not willing or able to put into practice. The resulting de jure-de facto gap would then be the result of the political incentives set by the rules of the EU accession process.
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This would be in line with Bjørnskov's (2015) observation that constitutional property rights protection in these formerly communist countries was, at best, ineffective.
A closely related alternative explanation is the following: Over the last couple of years, the importance of judicial organization has become apparent. Countries that have passed or reformed their procedural law in the recent past are therefore more likely to have a modern law and are, hence, more likely to receive high de jure scores. This potential explanation is difficult to untangle empirically from the EU accession process, as all transition countries, i.e. all new members from Central and Eastern Europe, have completely revised their legal systems over the course of the last two decades.
Our second potential explanation concerns fundamental differences between countries with respect to the functioning of their legal systems. La Porta et al. (2008) , for example, argue that a country's legal origin is highly correlated with its legal rules and regulations. Specifically, they summarize empirical evidence showing that common law countries have a less formalized, but more independent judicial system in comparison to French civil law countries. Based on this observation, one could expect that a specific group of countries with a shared legal origin is driving the negative association between de jure and de facto JI in the European Union. Klerman et al. (2011) to distinguish between French legal origin, German/Scandinavian legal origin, and a small residual group of common law and mixed legal origin. For the EU, we find exactly the opposite of the expected pattern. The negative association between de jure and de facto JI is clearly driven by the old member states. The results for legal origins do not meet our expectations either: All groups of countries exhibit a comparable negative slope.
To sum up, trying to put together the puzzle that a seemingly "better" organizational structure of the judiciary is significantly correlated with lower perceived JI, we have asked whether differences between old and new EU member states, or differences between particular legal families might be responsible. Neither explanation turned out to be of help in dealing with our puzzle. This is why we propose to look at more fundamental cultural traits in Section 4.
Culture as an Explanation?
Given that neither recent EU membership, nor legal tradition have proven helpful in explaining the discrepancy between de jure and de facto JI in the EU, we now turn to a more fundamental explanation, namely culture. An important theoretical basis for approaching our puzzle with culture as a potential explanation is provided by Aghion et al. (2010) who argue that beliefs and institutions coevolve. More specifically, their model predicts that distrust creates public demand for regulation in a society, and regulation in turn discourages the formation of trust, allowing for multiple stable equilibria. These conjectures are supported by empirical cross-country evidence (Aghion et al. 2010; Pinotti 2012; Pitlik and Kouba 2015) . More recent studies have linked individualism to a reduced demand for regulation (Pitlik and Rode 2017) .
Although individualism and trust may decrease the public's demand for regulation (of the judiciary), both traits might, at the same time, be responsible for higher levels of de facto JI. More individualistic societies should be less tolerant of state interference in judges' decision-making, whereas more collectivistic societies might be more willing to accept such interventions at the detriment of individuals whose rights might be violated as a consequence. Research by Nannicini et al. (2013) suggests that generalized trust enhances the accountability of politicians, making violations of laws and social norms less likely. Taken together, these arguments suggest that societies with high levels of individualism and trust might be less in need of formal barriers between the judiciary and the other branches of government to maintain high levels of JI. These countries might enjoy considerable JI even in the absence of formal rules for the insulation of the judiciary, because politicians expect to be held accountable for their behavior and have, thus, few incentives to intervene in court decisions. In the following, we test whether individualism and trust might be responsible for the gap between de jure and de facto JI that we observe in the EU.
Generalized trust measures the share of the population that believes that most people can be trusted. In trying to make culture empirically accessible, Hofstede Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between individualism in society, as measured by Hofstede et al. (2010) , and our indicators of de jure and de facto JI. As expected, we observe that more individualistic societies are more likely to have high levels of (perceived) de facto JI, whereas their expected level of de jure JI is lower than that of low-trust countries. Figure 4 shows the same pattern for trust.
High-trust societies can be expected to have a de facto independent judiciary, whereas they lack strict regulation to insulate the judiciary from the other branches of government. Taking Figures 3 and 4 together, the effect of culture on de jure JI appears to be comparable between the old and new EU member states, whereas the effect on de facto JI seems to be more pronounced in the EU-15.
While these figures offer a first impression of the validity of our theory, regression analysis allows us to carry out more precise and differentiated evaluations. In Section 2, we demonstrated that de jure constraints on the transfer of judges contribute particularly to the negative relationship between de jure and de facto JI. When we explain the different de jure components by the levels of individualism or trust found in specific countries, we observe that trust is indeed negatively associated with de jure constraints on the transfer of judges. These results are shown in Appendix C. We run the three regressions for individualism and trust, respectively, using seemingly unrelated regression analysis, which allows us to test the coefficient of individualism or trust across all three equations for being significantly different from zero. We can reject the null hypothesis of no statistical association only for trust, underlining its robust negative association with de jure JI.
Another question we can address using regression analysis is whether de jure and de facto JI are, in fact, directly influenced by cultural differences between countries, or whether the effect of culture on de facto JI partially runs via de jure JI. For this purpose, we rely on causal mediation analysis, as proposed by Hicks and Tingley (2011) . We set up a simple model, where both individualism and trust may affect de facto JI. However, they may do so either directly or indirectly by affecting de jure JI, which would then serve as a mediator. In line with our theoretical arguments, we find that less than 5% of the effect of culture on de facto JI is mediated via de jure JI (detailed results available on request). We consider this evidence as support of our theoretical argument that de jure and de facto JI are, directly and independently of each other, affected by cultural traits. Further diagnostic tests confirm that our instrumental variables are not weak and the overidentification test rejects the null hypothesis only in one of six cases. The results of our IV regressions suggest that there is a causal effect of culture on JI. Table 3 offers another extension of our regression analysis by distinguishing old and new EU member states. For this purpose, we include an interaction term between each cultural trait and an EU-15 dummy in our regression models from Panel A in Table 2. Table 3 reports the marginal effects for each group of countries. Due to the very small samples comprising each of these two groups, the results should be treated with caution. Overall, we find no significant difference between the role of culture in the EU-15 and the remaining member states.
To sum up, our results suggest that the observed negative association between de jure and de facto JI in member states of the European Union is the result of two independent effects of cultural traits. Individualism and (maybe even more importantly) trust lead to higher levels of de facto JI; at the same time, both traits reduce the public demand for regulation and thereby lower incentives for politicians to introduce legislation that would formally insulate the judiciary from the other branches of government.
Conclusion and Outlook
Based on data from the EU's Justice Scoreboard, we make a puzzling finding, namely that formal legislation passed to enhance judicial independence (JI) is negatively correlated with de facto JI. We ask whether this finding is driven by the new EU member states or by belonging to a particular legal family, but find that this is not the case. Therefore, we turn to a more fundamental explanation, namely that culture, in the form of individualism and trust, might be responsible for the gap between de jure and de facto JI. We find that both individualism and trust are negatively associated with de jure independence, but positively with perceived independence.
The findings of this paper can also be read as a contribution to the growing literature that finds a very important role for informal institutions. What is striking about our particular findings is that informal institutions seem to be highly relevant in one of the most highly developed regions of the world, namely Western Europe. It would, of course, be interesting to extend this study and ask whether the relevance of culture extends beyond the EU, as we would expect.
It is hard to overstate the policy implications of our findings. On the one hand, they might be discouraging, because culture plays an important role for the quality of institutions and it is largely exempt from policy interventions by the government. On the other hand, our results suggest that mere correlations are not always indicative of the effectiveness of a policy reform. The negative association between de jure and de facto JI does not imply that legal reforms are necessarily ineffective or even counterproductive. However, their relevance seems to be substantially smaller than that of deeply rooted cultural differences between countries. 
